INTRODUCTION
...it costs us approximately $60-70 thousand dollars a day per ship to put it in the afloat prepositioning mode.
Additionally, the equipment aboard these ships must be duplicated.
In order to train troops, you must have equipment ashore as well as aboard the ships.
Currently, we are in fairly decent shape because as we have gone through the drawdown, we have ended up with excess equipment to put on those ships. As we modernize our equipment, we face a bill for duplicate equipment for ashore and afloat prepositioning.
-GEN Robert L. Rutherford The APA program provides a unique capability to the war-fighting CINC, but is it worth the cost? In this day of flat, or decreasing budgets, can the U.S. Army afford to devote the resources required to maintain and modernize a heavy brigade of modern equipment with associated supplies floating around the world while many active duty units wait diligently to receive the same modern, upgraded equipment? This paper addresses these issues and attempts to provide a clear, unemotional assessment to the reader.
Where appropriate, recommendations or changes to the current program are provided.
If a conflict broke out in the Persian Gulf today, the Army would try to deploy a full heavy division to the region in about two weeks. This strategy reduces the risk to the early deploying light forces, but is more ambitious than the requirement laid down by the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) and places significant demands on U.S. strategic mobility. This stated goal actually would require the transportation system to deliver a heavy division to the Persian Gulf in about half the time it did in 1990. The task is even harder today because Army units require more floor space and has gotten heavier over time as it has modernized its equipment. Yet deployments to the Persian Gulf, such as Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994, suggests that the Army may be able to achieve its goals through prepositioning.
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The United States is in the midst of reducing the size of its military forces. Most types of combat forces have been cut, but the same is not true for strategic mobility forces. The Department of Defense is holding the current airlift capability constant, while expanding the number and capacity of sealift ships. This suggests that the United States must deploy over significant distances to reach regional conflicts. Another reason for the emphasis is the experience of the deployment to the Persian Gulf area in 1990. Although this deployment was vast in scope, deployment of heavy units was slow in occurring and all forces weren't in place for seven months.
One final reason for the emphasis on mobility forces has to do with the military build-up of the 1980s. The Department of Defense spent great sums of money to modernize the force with the latest tactical aircraft, combat ships, and armored vehicles during the build-up. Now that most of these modernization efforts are .complete, more money is available to accomplish a significant upgrade to mobility forces. 5 A capability such as the APA comes at a high price.
This price includes the real dollars involved with procuring the massive naval ships necessary to warehouse and move the APA around the world, the investment required by the U.S.
Army to obtain and maintain an additional set of equipment, and the organizational expense to provide direction and oversight to a program of this magnitude.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE APA PROGRAM
The APA got its official start in 1992 with the congressionally mandated mobility requirements study, but the U.S. Army maintained some equipment and supplies afloat prior to this date. The APA has a heritage that dates back to 1980. In his Supplies and equipment were identified for general use and not specific units. By the late 1980s, the expense to maintain these stocks afloat grew to almost $60 million annually. The standard timeline includes the goal of deploying a heavy brigade, using the APA, in 15 days.
Initially, equipment to support the APA came from units that were inactivated and removed from USAREUR. The 21 st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) was tasked to gather the equipment, prepare it for storage aboard ships, and load it at the port of Antwerp, Belgium.
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Representatives from Depot System Command inspected all of the equipment at various motor pools throughout Europe.
Once the equipment met the required standards, property accountability was transferred to USAMC. The equipment was moved to Antwerp and loaded aboard contracted roll-on-roll-off ships.
These ships sailed to Charleston, South Carolina where additional equipment was loaded and stowage plans were finalized.
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Ammunition basic loads and other supplies were loaded and the ships moved to anchorage in Diego Garcia. The equipment would stay on these contracted ships until the delivery of the first converted LMSR ships in 1997.
CURRENT STATUS OF APA
The current policy for the APA program is to maintain a heavy brigade set of equipment uploaded on ships, along with associated combat support and combat service support equipment.
Equipment to support the requirements for ship off-load, port, and onward-movement operations is included in the mix.
Sustainment supplies for the heavy brigade and the initial elements of the contingency corps are also included.
The APA equipment set is earmarked for the first heavy brigade to arrive on the ground during contingency operations.
As discussed earlier, the goal is for this brigade to be ready to fight not later than C+15. The APA brigade set includes equipment for a 2x2 heavy brigade: two armored and two mechanized battalions plus supporting units. Equipment that is scheduled for replacement is disposed of. Given that we can not afford to have piles of equipment all around the world, we must pick carefully when deciding where to place land-based pre-positioned equipment. As General Rutherford stated in the opening epigraph, you must guess correctly on where it will be needed and accept that the equipment is particularly vulnerable to loss. It is also increasingly difficult to obtain basing rights with foreign states to construct these prepositioned sites. In my opinion, we have gone about as far as possible with land-based pre-positioning.
APA takes us that next step, but there are drawbacks to a policy of pre-positioned afloat equipment that must be addressed.
It costs from $60-70 thousand dollars a day to operate the APA fleet.
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Are we prepared to invest that much money to keep one brigade's equipment available on the world's oceans? Equipment on board a ship is extremely hard to maintain and modernize. As with any pre-positioned equipment, a duplicate set is maintained and this is certainly costly in itself. The equipment set must be maintained with equipment as modern as that currently fielded to potential deploying units. When the time comes to modernize major combat systems, pre-positioned equipment sets must be planned into the priority list at the same level as the units that will potentially use this equipment. It is apparent that modernizing pre-positioned equipment sets in concert with high priority units will further delay the modernization of other lower priority units. While this is unfortunate, it is necessary to ensure that units will receive equipment from the APA program that they are trained to use and is in a combat ready status.
The APA equipment sets must be funded and filled to the same standard as any Force Package-1 unit. The Army appears to be committed to this effort. 
